The panel reversed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants Alaska Airlines, Inc., and Association of Flight Attendants-CWA AFL-CIO (“AFA”) and remanded for further proceedings in an employment discrimination action brought by former flight attendants Marli Brown and Lacey Smith.

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Brown and Smith claimed that Alaska fired them because of their religious beliefs, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and state anti-discrimination laws, and that their union, AFA, discriminated against them based on their religious beliefs during Alaska’s internal investigation. The district court granted summary judgment for Alaska and AFA on plaintiffs’ federal claims and further concluded that the Railway Labor Act preempted their state anti-discrimination claims against the union.

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Plaintiffs were fired after they posted comments on Alaska’s World, an internal intranet communications network, in response to the company’s post announcing its support for the Equality Act, proposed federal legislation that would extend certain federal nondiscrimination requirements to cover discrimination involving sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity in various contexts. The panel held that, whether viewed through the lens of direct and circumstantial evidence or through the burden-shifting McDonnell-Douglas framework for Title VII cases, plaintiffs demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact whether Alaska terminated them because of their religious beliefs, and the district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment on their Title VII and state law claims. Plaintiffs also demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact whether AFA attempted to cause or acquiesced in their firing because of their religious beliefs.

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Brown posted a facially religious statement that the Equality Act would endanger the Christian church, encourage suppression of religious freedom, and eliminate conscience protections, and Alaska and the union understood the religious basis for the post. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Brown, there was a genuine dispute of material fact whether she was in fact fired for engaging in discrimination or harassment or whether Alaska instead used the cover of its employee policies to fire her because of her religious beliefs.

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Smith’s comment on Alaska’s World, that “As a company, do you think it’s possible to regulate morality?” was not explicitly grounded in religious belief, but Alaska considered Smith’s situation in connection with Brown’s, working them up together. The panel concluded that a reasonable jury could find that the company’s stated neutral reasons for firing Smith were pretextual and that there was a genuine dispute of material fact whether AFA attempted to cause Smith’s termination based on her religious beliefs or acquiesced in it.

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Agreeing with the Second and Eighth Circuits, the panel held that the Railway Labor Act’s duty of fair representation did not impliedly preempt plaintiffs’ Oregon and Washington state law anti-discrimination claims against AFA.

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Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Christen concurred in the majority’s conclusion that both plaintiffs demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact that should have prevented entry of summary judgment regarding: (1) whether plaintiffs’ union, the AFA, attempted to cause or acquiesced in the termination of their employment on the basis of their religious beliefs; and (2) whether Alaska Airlines terminated Brown on the basis of her religious beliefs. Judge Christen also agreed that the plaintiffs’ state law claims were not preempted by the Railway Labor Act. Judge Christen dissented from the majority’s decision to reverse the district court’s entry of summary judgment on Smith’s claims against Alaska because she did not agree that Smith demonstrated a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Alaska terminated her because of her religion.

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https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/06/24/24-3789.pdf