Public school districts may not classify a teacher as a temporary employee “unless the position in which he or she is employed is ‘a position the law defines as temporary.’ ” (Stockton Teachers Assn. CTA/NEA v. Stockton Unified School Dist. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 446, 457 (Stockton).) Education Code section 44920 permits school districts to hire and classify a teacher as a temporary employee for up to one school year to replace a teacher who “has been granted leave for a semester or a year, or is experiencing long-term illness.” (Italics added.)
Relying on section 44920, the Alta Loma School District (District) defends its classification of Melissa Washington as a temporary employee for the three consecutive years she taught at the District’s elementary school. Specifically, the District claims it hired Washington to fill in for two permanent teachers who were sharing one full-time teaching position under a voluntary job-sharing arrangement. It contends such a job-sharing arrangement constitutes “leave” under section 44920, permitting the District to classify Washington as a temporary employee and ultimately to summarily dismiss her after her third year of teaching. We disagree.
We hold the term “leave” under section 44920 means “leave of absence.” Part-time work such as a teacher’s reduction in workload due to a voluntary job-sharing arrangement does not constitute a leave of absence under section 44920 that permits the hiring and classification of his or her replacement as a temporary employee. In reaching this conclusion, we follow our Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 821, 826 (Balen) that temporary classifications for teachers should be strictly construed.
We thus agree with Washington that she was misclassified as a temporary employee during the entire term of her employment. Under the Education Code, Washington defaulted to the classification of a probationary employee for the first two school years, after which she became a permanent employee by operation of law for the third year. As a permanent employee, the District was not permitted to summarily dismiss Washington. The trial court erred by concluding otherwise and denying Washington’s petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085). We reverse the judgment and remand with instructions for the trial court to issue a writ of mandate directing the District to reinstate Washington as a permanent employee with the seniority date of August 2, 2019, and to hold further proceedings to determine her damages for lost compensation. In doing so, we reject the District’s argument that the doctrine of laches bars the relief we grant Washington.
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