The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment for the City of Chubbuck, Idaho, and the City’s Mayor, Kevin England, in Rodney Burch’s action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Idaho state law, alleging that defendants took adverse employment actions against him because of his protected speech made while he was the Public Works Director.
Burch’s speech falls into two categories: (1) his criticisms of England’s policies and performance as Mayor, as well as his proposal and advocacy to create a city administrator position as a solution to England’s alleged deficiencies; and (2) his political yard sign supporting England’s opponent during England’s re-election campaign.
Applying a five-step inquiry to balance Burch’s interest as a citizen to comment on matters of public concern and the interest of the State as an employer, the panel held that Burch’s First Amendment retaliation claim failed as a matter of law. At step one, Burch’s speech addressed a matter of public concern. At step two, Burch’s yard sign supporting England’s mayoral opponent was protected speech, but his criticism of England’s policies and performance and advocacy for adding a city administrator was made pursuant to his official duties as the Public Works Director and therefore was unprotected. At step three, a reasonable factfinder could find that Burch suffered at least one adverse employment action—though not a constructive discharge— and that Burch’s yard sign was a “substantial or motivating factor” in at least one of the adverse employment actions. However, at steps four and five, in which the burden shifts to defendants, the panel held that there was no genuine dispute that defendants had an adequate justification for their adverse actions—including asking Burch to resign, transferring his duties and reducing his workload—and would have reached the same employment decisions had Burch never erected his yard sign.
Finally, the panel held that the district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants on Burch’s Idaho state law claim because none of the adverse employment actions occurred within the statute of limitations.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2025/07/25/24-3646.pdf
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