Tina Turrieta, Brandon Olson, and Million Seifu each worked as a driver for Lyft, Inc. (Lyft) and each filed a separate action seeking civil penalties under PAGA for Lyft’s alleged failure to pay minimum wages, overtime premiums, and business expense reimbursements.

In September 2019, Turrieta and Lyft attended a mediation. When they failed to reach agreement, the mediator made a settlement proposal based on his valuation of the case, and the parties accepted the proposal. In early December 2019, Turrieta and Lyft signed an agreement settling Turrieta’s action and scheduled a settlement approval hearing for January 2, 2020.

Before that hearing, Olson and Seifu filed separate motions to intervene in Turrieta’s action and submitted objections to the settlement. The trial court denied the motions, approved the settlement, and later denied the motions of Olson and Seifu to vacate the judgment.

Olson and Seifu appealed, challenging both the settlement and the denials of their various motions. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the trial court had properly denied the intervention motions and that Olson and Seifu lacked standing to move in the trial court to vacate the judgment or to challenge the judgment on appeal. Olson petitioned for our review of the appellate court’s decision, asserting that as a deputized agent of the state under PAGA, he has the right, on behalf of the state, to intervene in Turrieta’s action, to move to vacate the judgment in that action, and to have the court consider his objections to the proposed settlement of that action.

The Supreme Court of California affirmed in the case of Turrieta v Lyft Inc., – S271721 (August 2024)

“This case involves what has become a common scenario in PAGA litigation: multiple persons claiming to be an ‘aggrieved employee’ within the meaning of PAGA file separate and independent lawsuits seeking recovery of civil penalties from the same employer for the same alleged Labor Code violations.”

The Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) provides that an aggrieved employee, after complying with specified procedural prerequisites, may “commence a civil action” to recover civil penalties that the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) has statutory authority to collect civil penalties from employers that violate certain provisions of the Labor Code. LWDA may assess and collect. (§ 2699.3, subd. (a)(2)(A).)

The Court of Appeal ruled that Olson and Seifu could not “meet the threshold” requirement under Code of Civil Procedure section 387 for either mandatory or permissive intervention: “[A] direct and immediate interest in the settlement.” (Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 955, at pp. 971-972.) For reasons similar to those related to their lack of standing, the court explained, their “position as PAGA plaintiffs in different PAGA actions does not create a direct interest in [Turrieta’s action], in which they are not real parties in interest. [Their] interest in pursuing enforcement of PAGA claims on behalf of the state cannot supersede the same interest held by Turrieta in her own PAGA case. . . . [They] have no personal interest in the PAGA claims and any individual rights they have would not be precluded under the PAGA settlement.” (Id. at p. 977.)

On appeal, the Supreme Court commenced its review of the Court of Appeal decision by saying “In recent years, we have addressed several issues related to PAGA litigation. We begin with a review of the basic principles set forth in our prior PAGA decisions because they provide context for deciding the issues now before us.” Thus this 96 page Opinion is a must read by practitioners in this area of law.

“Although a PAGA plaintiff may use the ordinary tools of civil litigation that are consistent with the statutory authorization to commence an action, such as taking discovery, filing motions, and attending trial, the Supreme Court concluded – for reasons explained in the opinion – that the authority Olson seeks in this case – to intervene in the ongoing PAGA action of another plaintiff asserting overlapping claims, to require a court to consider objections to a proposed settlement in that overlapping action, and to move to vacate the judgment in that action – would be inconsistent with the scheme the Legislature enacted.”

This conclusion best comports with the relevant provisions of PAGA as read in their statutory context, in light of PAGA’s legislative history, and in consideration of the consequences that would follow from adopting Olson’s contrary interpretation.

Cal Supreme Ct. Limits Overlapping PAGA Claims Against Same Employer