In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC (2012) 565 U.S. 171, 188 (Hosanna-Tabor), the United States Supreme Court recognized, for the first time, a ministerial exception under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment.  Under that exception, courts must “stay out of employment disputes involving those holding certain important positions with churches and other religious institutions” (Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru (2020) 591 U.S. 732, 746 (Our Lady)), if those disputes will, by their very nature, require “the court to resolve a religious controversy” (Sumner v. Simpson University (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 577, 590 (Sumner)).  Applying the exception, the high court has barred “a minister’s employment discrimination suit based on the church’s decision to fire her.”  (Id. at p. 580.)  We now consider whether the ministerial exception bars claims under California’s minimum wage and overtime laws even though there is no evidence that those claims would interfere “with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”  (Hosanna-Tabor, at p. 190.)  We conclude it does not. 

In this case, plaintiff Annette Lorenzo appeals a judgment in favor of defendants and respondents San Francisco Zen Center (Center), Linda Galijan, and Mike Smith (collectively, defendants) following the trial court’s order granting summary judgment against Lorenzo.  The court held that the ministerial exception barred Lorenzo’s wage-and-hour claims even though defendants presented no evidence that her claims raised an ecclesiastical concern.  But without such evidence, the Religion Clauses cannot and do not bar Lorenzo’s wage claims.  We therefore reverse.

We also find that the trial court erred in denying Lorenzo’s motion to dismiss the appeals of Galijan and Smith because they did not post an undertaking as required by Labor Code section 98.2, subdivision (b).  The Labor Commissioner found Galijan and Smith liable under section 558.1—which renders them “liable as the employer for” the wage-and-hour violations alleged by Lorenzo.  (Italics added.)  Because section 98.2, subdivision (b), requires “an employer” to post an undertaking in order to perfect that employer’s appeal from a Labor Commissioner’s order, both Galijan and Smith could only appeal the order against them if they each posted an undertaking.  But the undertaking posted by the Center did not, by its terms, include Galijan and Smith.  The court therefore lacked jurisdiction to hear Galijan’s and Smith’s appeals.  For this independent reason, we reverse the judgment in favor of Galijan and Smith. 

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A171659.PDF