Plaintiff James Peros filed this action against his former employer, The Permanente Medical Group (TPMG), and unspecified related entities after TPMG discharged him.
TPMG filed a special motion to strike the complaint—or, alternatively, specific allegations—as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP) under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Known as the anti-SLAPP statute, section 425.16 “allows [a] defendant[ ] to seek early dismissal of unmeritorious claims arising from protected speech and petitioning activities.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1004 (Bonni I).) The procedure consists of two steps. (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 396 (Baral).) At the first, the defendant bears the burden of identifying allegations of protected activity and the claims supported by those allegations. (Ibid.) At the second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that such claims are legally sufficient and factually substantiated. (Ibid.) When a court grants an anti-SLAPP motion, it does so without leave to amend. (Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 897–898 (Medical Marijuana).)
Applying the two-step process, the trial court struck a number of specifically challenged allegations, effectively striking Peros’s claims that arose from protected activity. But the court determined that the complaint also included claims that did not arise from protected activity. It declined to strike those claims.
On appeal, TPMG contends that once the trial court excised the protected-activity allegations at step two, no cognizable claim remained. At that point, TPMG argues, the anti-SLAPP statute required the trial court to strike the entire complaint. TPMG rests this argument on its contention that a demurrer is an inadequate procedure to address the insufficient remaining claims because it allows the court to grant Peros leave to amend. Leave to amend in these circumstances, TPMG continues, would undermine the anti-SLAPP statute’s purpose of providing quick dismissal of a meritless complaint targeted at protected activity.
We agree with the trial court that claims resting exclusively on allegations of unprotected activity are not subject to step two of the anti-SLAPP procedure, even if the defendant argues that they are legally insufficient. We therefore conclude that the court did not err by refusing to strike the entire complaint.
In the alternative, TPMG appeals the trial court’s refusal to strike several specific allegations. Finding no error, we affirm.
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