Defendant Tesla Motors, Inc. (Tesla) appeals from an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of the claims of plaintiff and respondent Talia Shayla Alexis Wise.  In denying the motion, the trial court found that the parties’ [employment] arbitration agreement should be read together with their nondisclosure agreement.  (Civ. Code, § 1642.)  Finding that the nondisclosure agreement contained unconscionable terms and that the unconscionability permeated the agreement to arbitrate, the court concluded that the arbitration agreement could not be enforced.  On appeal, Tesla argues that:  (1) section 1642 is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1; FAA); (2) the parties’ agreements should not be read together under section 1642; (3) if read together, the terms of the agreements are not unconscionable; and (4) if any terms are unconscionable, they should have been severed so the arbitration provisions could be enforced.

Although we disagree that the FAA preempts section 1642, we agree that the trial court should have severed the allegedly unconscionable terms and enforced the arbitration agreement.  Those terms applied to all proceedings, and not just arbitrations, and had no bearing on the causes of action that Wise asserted.  Nor did they threaten the arbitration procedure itself.  The terms were therefore collateral to and severable from the arbitration agreement, and the interests of justice favored enforcement of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.  Accordingly, we reverse without reaching the other two arguments raised by Tesla.

https://www4.courts.ca.gov/opinions/documents/A170983.PDF