The panel affirmed in part the district court’s dismissal of Sabrina Beram’s action against the City of Sedona, reversed the dismissal for lack of standing of her claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and remanded.
Beram, a Sedona resident, often sleeps in her car because her obsessive-compulsive disorder prevents her from entering her apartment. The city criminalized sleeping in a car, and Beram has twice been warned by city police officers for doing so. The city denied her request for reasonable accommodation under the ADA exempting her from enforcement of its criminal ordinance when she sleeps in her car at her apartment complex. The district court dismissed Beram’s claims for lack of standing.
Reversing the dismissal of the ADA claim, the panel held that a person with a disability alleging discrimination must satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III by alleging that (1) she suffered a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent injury-in-fact; (2) the defendant likely caused her injury, and (3) judicial relief would likely redress her injury. Discrimination under the ADA is generally an injury-in-fact, but a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must also allege a sufficient likelihood of future harm, causation, and redressability.
The panel held that, as to her claim for damages, Beram alleged an Article III injury by alleging that the city denied her request for reasonable accommodation and caused her monetary and emotional harm. The panel held that Beram also had standing to seek injunctive relief based on the city’s credible threat of enforcement of its criminal ordinance.
The panel further held that Beram stated a viable theory under Title II of the ADA by alleging that (1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) she was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of her disability. The panel held that the “benefits” of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities may include mandatory activities such as compliance with municipal codes. Accordingly, discrimination under Title II may include the failure to provide reasonable accommodation that would allow a person with a disability to comply with a criminal ordinance.
The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of and denial of leave to amend Beram’s ADA claim. The panel instructed that on remand, Beram may file a fifth amended complaint asserting her ADA claim for damages and for declaratory and injunctive relief.
The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Beram’s Eighth Amendment claim, which she abandoned.
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/11/12/23-15912.pdf
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