The panel filed (1) an order withdrawing its opinion and dissent filed on March 4, 2026, and denying as moot a petition for rehearing en banc; and (2) a superseding amended opinion and dissent, affirming the district court’s denial of a motion by Uber Technologies, Inc. and Maplebear Inc. for a preliminary injunction to enjoin the City of Seattle from enforcing Seattle’s App-Based Worker Deactivation Rights Ordinance (the “Ordinance”), which applies to network companies that provide a platform for customers to hire temporary workers and prohibits unwarranted deactivations of these app-based workers’ accounts.

​

Section 8.40.050.A of the Ordinance requires (1) that a network company “inform” any app-based worker “in writing” of the company’s deactivation policy and (2) that the deactivation policy be “reasonably related” to the company’s “safe and efficient operations.” Plaintiffs, two network companies that rely on app-based workers for their businesses, alleged that the Ordinance compels speech in violation of the First Amendment, and that it is unconstitutionally vague.

​

Assuming, without deciding, that the Ordinance regulates speech, the panel concluded that speech is commercial speech, and the Ordinance’s regulation of it overcomes the applicable lower level of First Amendment scrutiny. Because the Ordinance regulates deactivation standards and requires companies to communicate those standards to their workers, the panel applied the test articulated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).

​

As to the Ordinance’s first requirement that network companies inform app-based workers of their deactivation policies, the panel held that it meets the test drawn from Zauderer, because the provision is reasonably related to Seattle’s goal to keep app-based workers informed and employed while keeping the public safe, does not purport to compel speech on controversial issues, and is not unduly burdensome.

​

Concerning the Ordinance’s second requirement that the deactivation policies be “reasonably related” to the companies’ “safe and efficient operations,” the panel concluded that provision is not an impermissible regulation of speech because it regulates speech related to what Seattle has designated as unlawful activity: the unwarranted deactivations of worker accounts.

​

The panel further held that the Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague because it provides fair notice to a person of ordinary intelligence as to what grounds for deactivation are reasonably related to safety and efficiency. Accordingly, the panel held that because Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the preliminary injunction.

​

Dissenting in part, Judge Bennett agreed with the majority that the Ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague. However, he disagreed with the majority’s decision to “[a]ssum[e] without deciding[] that the Ordinance regulates speech,” because the Ordinance does compel speech and is thus subject to the First Amendment. As for the majority’s alternative reasoning that the speech at issue is commercial speech and “overcomes the appropriate level of scrutiny,” Judge Bennett is unpersuaded and believe Plaintiffs have at least raised serious questions going to the merits. He would therefore vacate and remand to have the district court redo its analysis on the merits and reexamine the Winter preliminary injunction factors in light of a determination that the Ordinance is subject to intermediate scrutiny, and in light of the current facts.

​

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2026/10/29/25-231.pdf