Marlean Ames, a heterosexual woman employed by the Ohio Department of Youth Services, applied for a management position in 2019 but was denied in favor of a lesbian candidate. She was subsequently demoted from her program administrator role to a lower-paying secretarial position, which was then filled by a gay man.

Ames filed a lawsuit under Title VII, alleging discrimination based on her sexual orientation. The District Court granted summary judgment to the agency, citing Sixth Circuit precedent requiring majority-group plaintiffs (like heterosexuals) to show “background circumstances” indicating discrimination against the majority. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reinforcing a circuit split on whether majority-group plaintiffs face a higher evidentiary burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

In the unanimous decision in Ames v Ohio Department of Youth Services – 23-1039 – (June 2025), the United State Supreme Court vacated the Sixth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case, holding that Title VII does not impose a heightened evidentiary standard on majority-group plaintiffs. The “background circumstances” rule, which required majority-group plaintiffs to provide additional evidence suggesting that the employer discriminates against the majority, was deemed inconsistent with Title VII’s text and Supreme Court precedents.

Ohio conceded that Title VII imposes the same standard for all plaintiffs but argued the “background circumstances” rule was not a heightened burden. The Court rejected this, noting the Sixth Circuit explicitly applied a higher standard to Ames because of her heterosexual status.

The Court emphasized that Title VII prohibits discrimination against “any individual” based on protected characteristics (race, color, religion, sex, or national origin), without distinguishing between majority and minority groups. The statute’s focus is on individual protection, not group status (citing Bostock v. Clayton County 140 S.Ct. 1731 (2020) 590 U.S. 644).

Prior cases, such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) confirm that Title VII applies equally to all individuals, regardless of majority or minority status. The “background circumstances” rule violated this principle by imposing a higher burden on majority-group plaintiffs.

The Court reiterated that the McDonnell Douglas framework is a flexible, burden-shifting tool to evaluate disparate-treatment claims based on circumstantial evidence. The prima facie burden is not onerous, and the Sixth Circuit’s additional requirement for majority-group plaintiffs was an inflexible and improper deviation.

Justice Thomas agreed with the majority but wrote separately to criticize judge-made doctrines like the “background circumstances” rule and the McDonnell Douglas framework itself.

He argued that the “background circumstances” rule lacks textual basis in Title VII, distorts the statute by imposing unequal burdens, and is unworkable due to the difficulty of defining “majority” status (e.g., by race, sex, or religion) in varying contexts.

Thomas expressed skepticism about the McDonnell Douglas framework’s applicability at the summary judgment stage, noting its lack of textual grounding, incompatibility with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, failure to capture all ways to prove discrimination (e.g., mixed-motive cases), and tendency to cause judicial confusion. He suggested the Court reconsider its use in a future case.

The decision eliminates a circuit split, clarifying that Title VII’s protections apply uniformly to all plaintiffs, regardless of majority or minority status, and reinforces the statute’s focus on individual discrimination. It also signals potential future scrutiny of the McDonnell Douglas framework itself.

SCOTUS Rejects “Reverse” Employment Discrimination Standard