Charter Communications has nearly 100,000 employees and provides telecommunications services throughout the United States. Charter has adopted an alternative dispute resolution program called Solution Channel, which it describes as “the means by which a current employee, a former employee, an applicant for employment, or Charter can efficiently and privately resolve covered employment-based legal disputes.”

Charter job applicants had to agree to use Solution Channel. If a job offer was made, prospective employees used a computerized onboarding process. They were required to read several company documents and policies and to agree by use of an electronic signature. Thse documents included a Mutual Arbitration Agreement and the Solution Channel Guidelines.

Charter hired plaintiff Angelica Ramirez in July 2019. Using the onboarding process, Ramirez accepted the proposed Agreement, including adherence to the Guidelines. In May 2020, Ramirez was fired. She sued Charter in July 2020, alleging claims for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under the Fair Employment and Housing Act along with a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.

Charter moved to compel arbitration. The trial court found that the Agreement was one of adhesion because it was required as a condition of employment and also concluded additional provisions were unconscionable. Finding the Agreement was “permeated with unconscionability,” the court refused to enforce it and denied the motion to compel arbitration

The California Supreme Court granted review of the to consider the remedy (among other issues). Should the courts have refused to enforce the agreement, or could they have severed the unconscionable provisions and enforced the rest?

The Supreme Court concluded that the matter must be remanded for further consideration of this question in the case of Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. -S273802 (July 2024).

In its Opinion, the Supreme court agreed that some of the provisions of the Agreement were appropriately found to be unconscionable by the Court of Appeal, and disagreed in the reasoning of the Court of Appeals in others.  Many pages of the Opinion were dedicated to a discussion of the standards to be used in the analysis, and indeed are a clear guideline for employers who have agreements with employees as to arbitration of disputes.  However the Supreme Court when on to discuss the concept of severing the unconscionable provisions rather than refusing to enforce the agreement as a whole.

Civil Code section 1670.5, enacted in 1979,codifies the principle that a court can refuse to enforce an unconscionable provision in a contract. Civ. Code, § 1670.5, subd. (a).) provides that “If a contractual clause is found unconscionable, the court may, in its discretion, choose to do one of the following: (1) refuse to enforce the contract; (2) sever any unconscionable clause; or (3) limit the application of any clause to avoid unconscionable results.”

The “strong legislative and judicial preference is to sever the offending term and enforce the balance of the agreement.” Though the “statute appears to give a trial court some discretion as to whether to sever or restrict the unconscionable provision or whether to refuse to enforce the entire agreement,” it “also appears to contemplate the latter course only when an agreement is ‘permeated’ by unconscionability.” The trial court’s decision to act as Civil Code section 1670.5 permits is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Murphy v. Check ’N Go of California, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 138, 144 (Murphy).)

According to Charter, the Court of Appeal assumed that “while one or two provisions may be severed from an arbitration agreement, three or four is too many.” Charter urges that there is no hard and fast rule regarding the number of provisions that may be severed from a contract.

The Supreme Court noted that “some Courts of Appeal have treated the severance question as more of a quantitative inquiry than a qualitative one. (See, e.g., Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 90; Ontiveros v. DHL Express (USA), Inc. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 494 at p. 515; Murphy supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 149.) However, other courts have rejected the proposition that ‘more than a single unconscionable provision in an arbitration agreement precludes severance.’ (Lange, supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 454.) “

The Supreme Court then clarified by saying: “Here, we clarify that no bright line rule requires a court to refuse enforcement if a contract has more than one unconscionable term. . Likewise, a court is not required to sever or restrict an unconscionable term if an agreement has only a single such term. Instead, the appropriate inquiry is qualitative and accounts for each factor Armendariz identified. At the outset, a court should ask whether ‘the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality.’ ” Other clarifying remarks on this topic were made in the Opinion.

“The Court of Appeal’s judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with our decision.” … “On remand, the Court of Appeal may consider the severance question anew, in light of its answers to those questions, and in a manner consistent with this opinion.”

Guidelines Specified for Severability of Unconscionable Arbitration Provisions